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STOP REGULATING GOVERNMENT
PAPERWORK WITH MORE GOVERNMENT
PAPERWORK
Joseph D. Condon*
The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) is an often-ignored law with a large impact.
Federal agencies cannot ask the same questions of more than nine people or entities
without submitting a proposed information collection to the White House Office of
Management and Budget for review, a process that can take up to a year to complete. In
an attempt to regulate the amount of paperwork foisted on the public, the PRA has created
an enormous amount of paperwork for federal agencies—without any meaningful
reduction in the paperwork burden faced by the public. Yet, likely because the burden of
the PRA is borne primarily within agencies themselves, this law has gone relatively
understudied by legal academics. This note considers the PRA—its history, purpose,
functions, benefits and costs—and concludes that the PRA should be largely eliminated.
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INTRODUCTION
The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) has the sort of name that anyone can
get behind. No one likes paperwork. We should have less of it. The PRA goes
about this goal by requiring agencies to run through an approval process for any
information collection that involves asking more than nine people the same set of
1
questions. Agencies submit a package to the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) within the White House Office of Management and Budget with a
2
justification and estimate of the public burden. OIRA considers the proposal
along with submitted public comments, and either rejects the request or approves
3
it for up to three years.
This process is intended to force agencies to think carefully about the burdens
they impose on the public in the form of surveys, reporting requirements, and the
4
like. It centralizes approval to discourage duplicative paperwork across agencies.
5
The intended effect is to reduce the paperwork burden on the public.
Unfortunately, the PRA has not had this effect. In its thirty-seven years in existence, the paperwork burden imposed on the American public has grown substan6
tially. The causes of this growth—a growing population, increased economic activity, new information burdens established by Congress—are well beyond the reach
7
of the agencies constrained by the PRA. As this Note will argue, the benefits that
are associated with the PRA are minimal and largely secondary effects of the review process—not the significant constraint on government paperwork that its
drafters imagined.

1.

44 U.S.C. § 3502(3)(A)(i) (2017).

2.

44 U.S.C. §§ 3503-3504, 3506-3507 (2017).

3.

Id.

4.

44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2017).

5.

Id.

6.
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. AND REG. AFFAIRS, 2016
INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 2 (showing an increasing paperwork burden between FY2004 and FY2015).
7.

E.g., discussion of tax return lobbying infra Section I.A.

_JCI_CONDON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Fall 2019]

Regulating Government Paperwork

2/25/2020 4:18 PM

215

The PRA has introduced a significant paperwork burden on federal agencies.
The process of developing and submitting a package to OIRA can take six months
8
to a year. In my experience as a former government researcher, I worked on projects involving PRA surveys that stretched out over several years to comply with
9
the OIRA approval process for sampled surveys. I also worked on projects that,
although they would have been substantially improved through the use of a survey,
10
relied instead on individual and anecdotal interviews to draw conclusions. This
delay, although purposeful, forces agencies to forgo useful information collection,
delay actions that would support useful rulemaking, and inhibit program improvements that would meaningfully improve government functioning.
This note will proceed in three parts. Part I considers the background of the
PRA. This includes the burden of paperwork and administrative reporting on the
public, the government need for data and information collection, and a brief history of the legislation that has developed into the modern PRA. Part II discusses the
operation and effects of the PRA. After developing a working understanding of the
functioning of the PRA review process, this Part discusses the benefits and burdens of the law as it currently functions with respect to agencies and the public. I
conclude that the costs of the PRA outweigh the benefits. Finally, Part III considers proposals for reform, and recommends largely eliminating the PRA.

I. WHY REGULATE PAPERWORK?
Necessary though it may be, paperwork is a drag. It is a transaction cost and a
11
deadweight loss: something inherently inefficient. Generally speaking, people do
12
not enjoy or value filling out paperwork.
Nevertheless, information collection is one of the core functions of govern13
ment. This information collection frequently takes the form of paperwork: re-

8.
Estimates of delay vary. Based on the timeframes included in statute, PRA approval adds
four months to a collection. See 44 U.S.C. § 3506 (2017). However, this does not include required review internal to an agency or time spent preparing a package for review by OIRA. One study involving
interviews with a range of federal researchers put average delay at six to nine months. STUART
SHAPIRO, THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT: RESEARCH ON CURRENT PRACTICES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 51 (2012). The rule of thumb in the author’s former agency was to
add a year to a project schedule to incorporate agency and OIRA approval of a statistical survey.
9.

Author’s personal experience working in a federal agency.

10.

Author’s personal experience working in a federal agency.

11.
See Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 G EO. L. J. 1409, 1419-20 (2015); see also Cost, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
12.
See Emens, supra note 11, at 1420. This is especially true if the ultimate goal of that paperwork is to facilitate the regulation of your business. See, e.g., A. O. Smith Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n,
530 F.2d 515, 528 (3d Cir. 1976) (though the court denied an injunction, it acknowledged that “[a]ny
time a corporation complies with a government regulation that requires corporation action, [the corporation] spends money and loses profits”).
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quests for information directed at members of the public. Many of the public’s interactions with government involve paperwork: filing taxes, applying for licenses,
filling out Census forms, et cetera. For industry, one of the core forms of government regulation is a myriad of reporting requirements.
It should come as no surprise, then, that elected officials have worked hard to
14
constrain, control, and eliminate paperwork, or “red tape.” It is the rare lobby requesting an additional paperwork requirement for their constituency. Multiple
Presidents have emphasized eliminating paperwork as a goal of their administra15
tion. Congress has also attempted to legislatively regulate government paperwork. Most notably, in 1980 Congress passed the Paperwork Reduction Act
16
(PRA), and has revised it three times since.
The PRA attempts to regulate paperwork with additional paperwork. The
PRA created a new bureaucratic organ, the Office of Information and Regulatory
17
Affairs (OIRA), and established a process through which agencies seek OIRA
18
clearance before submitting a request for information. This process is intended to
force agencies to consider the costs of their information requests and provide for
19
centralized coordination between agencies. The PRA framework was developed
in response to a history of constituent frustration with government paperwork
20
driving political action.
This Part will provide some background on federal government paperwork: its
costs, its benefits, and a brief history of attempts to regulate it.

A. The Burden of Government Paperwork
Americans spend a great deal of time filling out paperwork from a variety of
sources—much of it from corporations and not-for-profits we do business with,
and another significant portion of it from state and local governments. Much of
that time and effort (that is to say, the cost of paperwork) is not well document-

13.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers . . . . The actual Enumeration shall
be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within
every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.”); see also William F.
Funk, The Paperwork Reduction Act: Paperwork Reduction Meets Administrative Law, 24 HARV. J. LEGIS.
1, 2 (1987) (“The eleventh law passed by the First Congress of the United States imposed a paperwork
requirement, the documentation of marine vessels.”)
14.

See Funk, supra note 13, at 26-30.

15.

See generally id.

16.

44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2017).

17.

44 U.S.C. § 3503 (2017).

18.

See 44 U.S.C. § 3506 (2017).

19.

See Funk, supra note 13, at 33-34.

20.

See id. at 13-14.
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ed. 21 Professor Richard Thaler has characterized the government-related portion of
this administrative work as “sludge,” or obstacles that diminish the effectiveness of
22
programs by erecting barriers to participation.
The burden of paperwork on citizens is not distributed evenly. Professor Elizabeth Emens notes that burdens of personal paperwork vary by socioeconomic sta23
tus and gender. Poor people face a disproportionate paperwork burden, as most
24
governmental assistance programs have onerous paperwork requirements. Indi25
viduals with means have better access to outsource this type of labor. Professor
Emens notes that marginalized groups tend to face higher administrative costs,
such as the burdens placed on transgender individuals who seek government
26
recognition of their identity, or burdens faced by same-sex married couples prior
27
to Obergefell v. Hodges.
The PRA, however, requires estimation of the burdens imposed by federal in28
29
formation collection. Historically, this cost is measured as “burden hours.” The
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), part of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), estimated the total burden of federal paperwork in
the 2015 fiscal year at 9.78 billion hours—an increase of 350 million hours from the

21.
See Emens, supra note 11, at 1414-15 (explaining how the federal government uniquely tracks
administrative cost as opposed to other sectors of society).
22.

Richard H. Thaler, Nudge, Not Sludge, 361 SCIENCE 431 (2018).

23.

Emens, supra note 11, at 1427, 1440-43.

24.

See KATHRYN J. EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST NOTHING
(2015) (“One way the poor pay for government aid is with their time.”).

IN AMERICA 2

25.

Emens, supra note 11, at 1427-28.

26.

Id. at 1413.

27.

135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that same sex marriage is constitutional).

28.
See 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1)(A)(iv) (2012) (requiring agency heads to include “a specific,
objectively supported estimate of burden” in proposals to OMB); 44 U.S.C. §3502(2) (2012) (“the term
‘burden’ means time, effort, or financial resources expended by persons to generate, maintain, or provide information to or for a Federal agency”).
29.

Funk, supra note 13, at 22-23.
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prior year. 30 This burden is felt by businesses, nonprofits, individuals, and house31
holds.
The total economic cost of federal government paperwork, including equipment, recordkeeping, labor, and opportunity cost, is not as well documented. For
instance, as noted by Professor Adam Samaha, while government monetization of
lives saved is commonplace for purposes of cost-benefit analysis, the monetization
of information collection burden occurs sporadically and without specific guidance
32
from OMB. Since the 1980s, the Federal Government has applied cost-benefit
analyses to new rulemakings and regulations, such that new rulemakings are almost
33
certainly cost-beneficial. Information collections, however, do not have to pass a
similar economic test. For instance, the IRS estimates the total burden of the 1040
individual income tax form is 1.97 billion hours (thereby accounting for nearly a
34
fifth of the entire federal paperwork burden). However, the IRS only provides
estimates of the financial cost of tax preparation, such as the costs of recordkeeping, tax preparation software, accounting services and the like; it does not monetize
35
this estimate of burden hours.
Tax preparation also provides an opportunity to consider the source of some
federal government paperwork burden. Some federal paperwork burden comes
from poorly thought-out forms or ineffective recordkeeping systems in the federal
36
government—the sort of thing the PRA is designed to address. But much federal
information collection is driven by Congressional mandate, and there are reasons
beyond mere administrative sloth that those systems remain burdensome. Some
interests benefit from federal burdens, and Congress is sometimes willing to coop30.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at i. Because this statistic is published in connection with the PRA, it excludes paperwork generated by agencies not covered by the PRA. For comparison, Americans worked around 285 billion hours in 2016.
Author’s calculation; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Table B-2, https://www.bls.gov/
news.release/empsit.t18.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (average weekly hours and overtime of all employees on private nonfarm payrolls by industry sector, seasonally adjusted); Average Weekly Hours,
retrieved from ECONOMIC RESEARCH, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AWHAETP (last visited Nov. 11, 2018); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Civilian Labor Force, retrieved from FRED, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CLF16OV (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
31.
See 44 U.S.C. § 3501(1) (2012). One study found that approximately 21% of information
collection requests implicated individuals and households. See Emens, supra note 11, at 1464 n. 235
(2015).
32.

Adam M. Samaha, Death and Paperwork Reduction, 65 DUKE L. J. 279 (2015).

33.
See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION 3-26 (2018) (describing what Professor Sunstein characterizes as a “revolution” in the application of cost-benefit analysis to
policymaking).
34.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SUPPORTING STATEMENT U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RETURN, OMB Control No. 1545-0074 (2018), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/Download
Document?objectID=85809800.
35.

See Samaha, supra note 32, at 295.

36.

See discussion of the operation of the PRA, infra Section II.A.
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erate. For example, a substantial and winning lobbying effort by members of the
tax preparation industry has encouraged Congress to slow or prevent changes that
37
would reduce the burden associated with filing personal income tax returns.

B. Government Information Collection Needs
Paperwork is a means to an end. 38 Although some paperwork may lack inher39
ent benefits, it generates critical secondary benefits. The regulation and organization of society and industry requires that the government know something about
what it seeks to regulate. Indeed, the information needs of governments have
40
shaped fundamental aspects of our society.
In the case of federal information collection, a great deal is required by statute
or, in the case of the Census, the Constitution. Federal agencies have a good deal
of discretion regarding the design of information requests, such as whether to use
electronic forms or which populations to target, that impact the overall burden of
the collection. However, they are ultimately constrained by the dictates of Con41
gress, so many burdens are unavoidable.
Federal information collection takes many forms. The PRA defines the “collection of information” as “obtaining, causing to be obtained, soliciting, or requiring the disclosure to third parties or the public, of facts or opinions by or for an
42
agency.” Perhaps most notably, the decennial census and other information collections conducted by the Census Bureau make up a significant portion of statistical collection by the federal government. Many other agencies conduct research or
statistical reporting that requires information collection from the public. As noted
43
above, tax collection represents an enormous portion of total federal paperwork.
Applications for government assistance, such as the Free Application for Federal
44
Student Aid (FAFSA), are covered by the PRA. Many agencies, such as the U.S.

37.
See Libby Watson, How Big-Money Lobbying is Making Tax Day Even More Complicated,
SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION (Apr. 13, 2016), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2016/04/13/how-big-moneylobbying-is-making-tax-day-even-more-complicated/.
38.

See Emens, supra note 11, at 1420.

39.
For instance, the Census provides data used in innumerable research studies, in addition to
supporting basic government functions.
40.
See, e.g., JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE 64-71 (1998) (describing state need to
develop surnames of individuals for purposes of tax collection schemes, among others in 13th century
England, 4th century China and 17th century Tuscany).
41.
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 2
n.8, 2-6 (discussing that most of the burden hours fall within the agency, but most of the increases in
burden hours are not due to agency discretion); see also Samaha, supra note 32, at 314 n.154.
42.

44 U.S.C. § 3502(3) (2017).

43.
See, e.g., 83 Fed. Reg. 51565 (Oct 11, 2018) (notice to public regarding Department of
Treasury’s submission to OMB for review and clearance in accordance with PRA).
44.
E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Free Application for Federal Student Aid 2 (2018),
https://fafsa.ed.gov/fotw1819/pdf/PdfFafsa18-19.pdf.
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Department of Transportation, maintain licensing and registration databases that
45
require information collection. Additionally, the federal government requires applications and data collection when administering a wide variety of grant pro46
grams. Information used to support the evaluation of government programs, such
47
as customer experience surveys and the like, is often covered.
Naturally, information collection includes survey research, which can be used
to inform rulemaking, the cost-benefit analysis used to support rulemaking, or gov48
ernance goals such as program evaluation or strategic planning. The requirements
of the PRA can also apply to any required exchanges of information between private parties (such as food labeling) and recordkeeping requirements of private par49
ties (such as workplace incident reports).

C. A Brief History of Paperwork Regulation
The federal government’s attempts to restrain its imposition of paperwork
date back over eighty years. In 1938, President Franklin Roosevelt ordered a study
from the Central Statistical Board on the volume of statistical reports requested by
50
the federal government from businesses. In part because of the recommendations
of this study, and because of the growing burdens of information collection gener51
ated by the wartime government, Congress passed the Federal Reports Act of
52
1942. This bill formed the basis of what would later become the Paperwork Reduction Act.
The Federal Reports Act placed the burden on agencies to reduce the burdens
53
they imposed on the public through information collection. The Federal Reports
Act positioned the Bureau of the Budget (BoB), the predecessor to the modern

45.
See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp., Unified Registration System, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Admin. (2019), https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/registration (discussing submission of personal information for
registration purposes).
46.
See NATALIE KEEGAN, FEDERAL GRANT FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND
DATABASES FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 2 (2016) (“[F]ederal agencies that administer federal grant programs must collect and report financial grant data to federal grant
databases”).
47.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NATIONAL APPEALS DIVISION CUSTOMER SERVICE
SURVEY, OMB Control No. 0503-0007, October 31, 2017, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201708-0503-002.
48.
See, e.g., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., GENERAL AVIATION AND PART 135 ACTIVITY SURVEY
SUPPORTING STATEMENT A, OMB Control Number 2120-0060 (May 24, 2018),
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=83338601.
49.

See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3)(A) (2012); Samaha, supra note 32, at 286.

50.

See Funk, supra note 13, at 7-8.

51.

See id. at 8.

52.
See Pub. L. No. 77-831, 56 Stat. 1078 (1942) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 35013520 (2012)).
53.

See Funk, supra note 13, at 10.
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OMB, 54 as a central check on agency information collection.55 As in the modern
regime, all information collections, defined as identical requests for information
56
required of 10 or more individuals, required approval from BoB. This included
both statutorily required information collection and collections where participation
was voluntary. Significantly, the Federal Reports Act exempted a wider swath of
57
agencies from review than later legislation.
Over time, however, the paperwork-filing public complained that the Federal
58
Reports Act was ineffective at reducing the burden of federal paperwork. In particular, business groups raised concerns regarding information requests from the
59
FTC that would have required significant changes to recordkeeping practices.
Companies attempted to challenge agencies in court over their adherence to the
60
Federal Reports Act, but were largely unsuccessful.
Constituent complaints about government paperwork brought two reforms in
61
the 1970s. The first was the concept of the “Information Collection Budget,”
where agencies were encouraged to adhere to a limited number of information collections. President Gerald Ford set goals for reducing the number of reports that
the federal government required of businesses. His effort was successful in reduc62
ing total reports, but was accompanied by an increase in burden hours. Focus
then shifted to burden hours. In a 1979 Executive Order, President Carter formally
adopted the Information Collection Budget, which tasked each agency with devel63
oping a budget for information collection burden hours. OMB was to conduct
annual reviews of information collection requests, with the goal of capping and re64
ducing the burden imposed by government paperwork.
65
The second reform was a national Commission on Paperwork. The resulting
66
Commission report, released in 1977, provided the impetus for congressional action to update the Federal Reports Act. The ensuing legislation was the Paperwork

54.
OMB).

See Exec. Order 11,541, 3 C.F.R. 939 (1966-1970) (delegating power from the BoB to

55.

See Funk, supra note 13, at 8.

56.

44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2017).

57.

See id. (exempting the Treasury and other financial agencies from review).

58.

See Funk, supra note 13, at 14-15.

59.

See id. at 17-18.

60.

See id. at 18-20.

61.

See id. at 20, 23.

62.

See id. at 24.

63.

Exec. Order 12,174, 49 Fed. Reg. 69,609 (Dec. 4, 1979).

64.
See Funk, supra note 13, at 23-25. This system remains in place today, despite not being
codified in statute. See id.
65.
(1974).
66.

See Funk, supra note 13, at 21. Created by Congress via Pub. L. No. 93-556, 88 Stat. 1789
COMM’N OF FED. PAPERWORK, FINAL SUMMARY REPORT (Oct. 3, 1977).
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Reduction Act of 1980.67 The PRA created the OIRA within OMB to centralize
68
control of information collection. It significantly increased the range of agencies
subject to OMB review, both by bringing the IRS and other financial agencies
69
70
within OMB’s ambit and by expanding the definition of information collection.
The PRA also added a public protection provision that exempted the public from
71
penalties for failure to respond to expired or non-cleared requests, and added
72
statutory deadlines for agencies to bring existing regulations into compliance.
By the early 1990s, the cycle had repeated itself. The business community
73
again complained of an overabundance of government paperwork. In 1995, Con74
gress responded with an updated Paperwork Reduction Act. The revamped Act, a
completely reenacted version of the legislation, once again expanded the definition
75
of both information and collection. The legislation also strengthened the clearance process by empowering OIRA with more criteria on which to approve or disapprove collections, and increased the information that agencies must supply with
76
proposed collections.
The most recent statutory change to the PRA was the Information Quality
77
Act (IQA), enacted in 2001. The IQA was a small addendum to a consolidated
appropriations bill that directed OMB to develop standards for statistical infor78
mation used, collected and distributed by the federal government. The provision
was met with concern by those who viewed it as designed to hinder environmental
rulemaking, eliciting worries that it would create more opportunities to challenge

67.
(2012)).

Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520

68.

44 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(C)(2) (2017).

69.

Funk, supra note 13, at 31, 36.

70.
Compare Pub. L. No. 77-831 § 5, 56 Stat. 1078 at 1079 (1942) (codified as amended at 44
U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2012)), with 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3) (2012) (defining “collection of information.”);
See also Funk, supra note 13, at 31-32.
71.

44 U.S.C. § 3512 (2017).

72.

Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2818 (1980).

73.
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Recent Developments: Regulatory Reform & The 104th Congress: Paperwork
Redux: The (Stronger) Paperwork Reduction Act Of 1995, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 111, 113 (1997).
74.
(2012)).
75.

Pub. L. 104-13, 109 Stat. 176 (1995) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520
Lubbers, supra note 73, at 118-19.

76.

See id. at 117.

77.

Pub. L. No. 106-554 § 515, 114 Stat. 2763A-153-54 (2001).

78.

Id.
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government action.79 While OMB has issued guidelines on data quality, the overall
80
impact of the provision is not yet clear.

II. THE OPERATION AND EFFECTS OF THE
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT
The central irony of the PRA is that it seeks to reduce the burden of paperwork on the public by imposing the burden of paperwork on federal agencies. This
Part will discuss 1) the operation and function of the PRA, 2) the effectiveness of
the PRA at reducing public paperwork burden, and 3) the effects of the PRA on
agency operations.

A. The Operation of the Paperwork Reduction Act
At its core, the PRA requires notice and comment and OMB approval for “in81
formation collections” conducted by covered agencies.

1. Agencies and Information Collections Covered
As discussed above, the number of agencies covered by the PRA has grown
82
over time. Today, the PRA covers every executive agency, military department,
government corporation or government-controlled corporation, and independent
regulatory agency, with four exceptions: the General Accounting Office (GAO),
the Federal Election Commission (FEC), the governments of the District of Columbia and other federal territories and possessions, and government-owned con83
tractor-operated facilities such as national laboratories. The requirements of the
PRA apply even to agencies that are not covered by OIRA review of cost-benefit
84
analysis. Independent regulatory agencies do, however, retain the power to reject
85
a disapproval by the OMB director by majority vote.

79.
Tammy P. Tideswell, The Information Quality Act: An Environmental Primer, 51 NAVAL L.
REV. 91-92 (2005).
80.
Id. at 96-97. Since the IQA’s adoption in 2001, there has been only one study of its effects
on federal rulemaking, whose results were inconclusive but whose prognosis was that it would hinder or
discourage rulemaking where agencies did not wish to subject themselves to IQA scrutiny. Id. at 97.
81.

See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3506-3508 (2017).

82.

See discussion supra Section II.C.

83.

44 U.S.C. § 3502(1) (2017).

84.
Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 “Regulatory Planning and Review” at § 3(b)
(Sept. 30, 1993). Because of the PRA, then, a rulemaking that is otherwise exempt from OIRA benefitcost review but requires information collection as defined by the PRA and its attendant regulations
must still receive OMB clearance.
85.
44 U.S.C. § 3507(f). After extensive research, the author has been unable to find an instance
of an independent agency rejecting the determination of the OMB director on this point.
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The Director of OMB has the power to delegate authority to a senior agency
86
official to manage that agency’s information collection processes. If a senior
agency official is deemed by OMB to be “sufficiently independent of program responsibility to evaluate fairly whether proposed collections of information should
be approved,” and has the resources to conduct those evaluations, the OMB direc87
tor can make a revocable delegation via notice-and-comment rulemaking. At present, OMB has delegated such power to two independent regulatory agencies: the
88
Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
The PRA defines information collection broadly. At its most basic, if an agency wants to ask identical questions of more than ten persons, it must receive clear89
ance from OIRA. “Persons” not only includes actual individuals, but also applies
to legal persons, such as corporations, as well as state and local government enti90
ties. The only category of person not included are “agencies, instrumentalities, or
91
employees of the United States.” The PRA, it must be emphasized, is concerned
solely with external paperwork burden on the public and offers no relief for a federal bureaucrat who finds herself drowning in mandatory forms.
The PRA’s broad definition of information collection goes beyond the mere
asking of questions on a form or survey, preventing agencies from getting around
its requirements through technicalities. Recordkeeping requirements and required
92
disclosures to the public or third parties qualify as information collections. Agencies may not skirt PRA requirements by, for instance, directing contractors or
93
grant recipients to collect information, or by partnering with a state agency.
The PRA provides some content-based exemptions to affected information
collection activities. The statute exempts federal criminal investigations, civil actions, administrative actions or investigations against specific individuals, collec94
tions required by an antitrust statute, and collections for intelligence. In 2016,
Congress exempted Inspectors General investigations and reviews from PRA re95
quirements. During the Obama administration, OMB itself issued guidance that
exempted a handful of activities from categorization as information collection un-

86.

44 U.S.C. § 3507(i); 5 C.F.R. 1320.16 (1997).

87.

44 U.S.C. § 3507(i).

88.

3 C.F.R. Pt. 1320 App. A (2008).

89.

44 U.S.C. § 3502(3) (2017).

90.

44 U.S.C. § 3502(10).

91.
44 U.S.C. § 3502(3)(A)(i)-(ii). This exception does not extend to “questions posed to agencies, instrumentalities, or employees of the United States which are to be used for general statistical
purposes.”
92.

5 C.F.R. 1320.3(c) (2018).

93.

See 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(d).

94.
44 U.S.C. § 3518(c)(1) at 150 (2018). The exception for investigations does not apply to
investigations targeting an industry or class. 44 U.S.C. § 3518(c)(2).
95.

5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(k) (2016).
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der the PRA. OMB clarified that certain social media uses, interactive web tools,
96
and general requests for comment were not covered by the PRA.
Importantly, the PRA does not ask whether the target of an information col97
lection is compelled to respond. An agency must comply with the PRA even if
98
response to its information collection is totally voluntary. The public policy rationale for scrutinizing compulsory information collection is quite clearly in line
with the intent of the PRA. Extending that scrutiny to voluntary requests perhaps
reflects an intent by Congress to limit the sort of soft power felt by regulated enti99
ties concerning requests from the federal government. If an agency does not
comply with the PRA for a given information collection, the most significant consequence is that the public may ignore the request without suffering any penalty
100
that would ordinarily come from not complying with the information collection.
However, this applies only to that portion of information collections covered by
101
the PRA that are compulsory for respondents. Information collections may face
additional scrutiny if included as part of a rulemaking, although the analysis may
102
not be as particular with regard to the form or information collection design.
The PRA also does not distinguish between information collection requests
103
that are required by statute and those that are subject to agency discretion.
However, the criteria that OIRA uses to evaluate an information collection includes its purpose and necessity—meaning OIRA is not likely to deny a record104
keeping requirement that is based on specific statutory language. They could,

96.
Memorandum from Cass Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Reg. Affairs, White House
Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Social Media, Web-Based Interactive Technologies, and the Paperwork
Reduction Act (Apr. 7, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/
inforeg/SocialMediaGuidance_04072010.pdf.
97.

See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3) (2018).

98.
See id. The definition of “information collection” in the statute makes no distinction between compulsory and voluntary collections.
99.
Indeed, some have described a sense of obligation to respond to government surveys by
individuals (separate from regulated entities) as a justification for applying PRA requirements to voluntary collections. See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 30 (describing a sense of obligation to respond to government surveys by individuals (separate from regulated entities) as justification for applying PRA requirements to voluntary collections).
100.

5 C.F.R. § 1320.6 (2019).

101.

See id. If a survey is voluntary, the withholding of a penalty has no effect.

102.
See Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993); 3 C.F.R. §§ 638, 640 (2018).
Rulemakings that impose record keeping requirements will not have the specificity of an OIRA PRA
package (such as a specific instrument design, etc.), but will still need to pass OMB cost-benefit review
generally.
103.

See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3) (2017).

104.

See 44 U.S.C. § 3506 (2017).
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however, still require changes to ensure that it is developed and implemented in a
105
minimally burdensome way.

2. Agency Requirements for OMB Approval
To proceed with an information collection, an agency must meet a number of
requirements. Suppose the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), in support
of a requirement imposed on it by Congress, wishes to survey state governments
106
regarding their use of a particular definition of “serious injury” in traffic data.
The FHWA is a grantmaking agency that administers federal highway funds by
107
distributing them to state governments. As such, its program implementation
(for instance, promoting safe highway design or tracking performance) regularly
requires the collection of information from state governments, which are “persons”
108
covered by the PRA’s definition of information collection. To begin, FHWA
must develop its request. Agency documentation must describe the desired information, evaluate the need for collection, provide a plan for collection and the management of collected information, evaluate whether electronic collection techniques
could reduce the burden on respondents, and, if appropriate, develop a pilot test of
109
the instrument. FHWA must also provide a specific estimate of the burden, including the time, effort, and money spent by states to generate, maintain, and dis110
close the requested information. In this example, because it is a relatively simple
survey, the burden is fairly straightforward: the time needed to assemble the data
and to respond, and the estimated number of respondents.
FHWA will next submit its request to the Department of Transportation’s
111
(DOT) Chief Information Officer (CIO). The PRA requires agencies to designate a CIO to oversee agency information collection activities, including evaluat112
ing information collection requests and managing information resources. The
CIO may require alterations of the request from FHWA. Once revised and approved by the CIO, DOT must put out the proposed collection for a sixty-day no-

105.
One could imagine this being used to slow the implementation of a recordkeeping requirement that an administration is ideologically opposed to. See infra Section III.C.4.
106.
This describes an information collection proposed by FHWA on September 28, 2018, pending as of this writing with OIRA. See Inventory of State Compliance on Serious Injury Reporting Using the Model Minimum Uniform Crash Criteria 4th Ed., ICR Reference No. 201806-2125-002,
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201806-2125-002 (last visited January 15,
2019) [hereinafter Inventory of State Compliance].
107.
Who We Are, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/about/ (last modified Apr. 1, 2019).

FED.

108.

See, e.g., Inventory of State Compliance, supra note 106.

109.

44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1)(A) (2017); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.8(a) (2018).

110.

5 C.F.R. § 1320.8(a)(4), 1320.3(b)(1).

111.

See 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1).

112.

Id.

HIGHWAY

ADMIN.,
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tice and comment period in the Federal Register. 113 Comments received must then
be incorporated, which may involve more quibbling between the CIO and
114
FHWA.
Once settled, the DOT CIO must certify that its request meets several criteria
115
laid out by the PRA and OMB regulations. The request must include answers to
eighteen questions for nonstatistical collection requests and twenty-three questions
116
for statistical collections. Then, the DOT CIO may submit its request to OMB,
and also publish notice of its request for approval in the Federal Register, designat117
ing a thirty-day window for the public to submit comments to OMB. Within
sixty days, provided that the thirty-day comment window has elapsed, the OMB
director must either approve, make a substantive or material change, deny the re118
quest, or direct FHWA to make a substantive or material change. If approved,
OMB will provide DOT and FHWA with a control number to attach to the collec119
tion, which may be valid for up to three years. If OMB fails to take action, the
request is presumed approved and OMB must provide a control number that may
120
be valid for up to one year. If FHWA wishes to renew the information collec121
tion, it must go through the process again prior to expiration.
Together, the development and approval of an information collection can take
122
from six months up to a year depending on departmental and OMB practices.
OIRA is generally regarded as short-staffed, having seen a reduction in headcount
and budget as its responsibilities have grown along with the size of the administra123
tive state. OIRA is particularly rigorous in its review of survey methods and statistical research, often requiring additional rounds of instrument testing and high

113.

44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.8(d)(1).

114.
This quibbling is likely to be informed by the DOT’s volume of requests. Because the CIO
is responsible for ensuring that the Department as a whole is meeting its targets under the PRA, the
CIO might dissuade certain information collections. At the very least, this step is another layer of review adding time to the schedule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2018) (requiring that an agency incorporate comments to a notice of proposed rulemaking).
115.

44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1)(A) (2017).

116.
See Paperwork Reduction Act Submission, OMB Form 83-I, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/1868/OMB%2083-I%20%28Paperwork%20Reduction%20Act%20Submission
%29.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2019).
117.

5 C.F.R. § 1320.10(a) (2018).

118.

5 C.F.R. § 1320.10(b).

119.
When relevant circumstances have changed or the burden estimates provided by the agency
upon submission have changed, OMB may, at its discretion, review the information collection for burden prior to the expiration of the control number. 5 C.F.R. 1320.10(b), (f).
120.

5 C.F.R. § 1320.10(c).

121.

5 C.F.R. § 1320.10(e).

122.

See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 26.

123.
John D. Graham & James W. Broughel, Stealth Regulation: Addressing Agency Evasion of
OIRA and the Administrative Procedure Act, 1 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y: FEDERALIST EDITION 30,
35-36 (2014).
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response rates for approval (despite significant scrutiny for monetary incentives to
124
support responses). The overall effect for agencies is a lengthy process to collect
information from the public.
OMB does have a process for emergency information collection. The agency
must provide a written determination that such an exigency exists, at which point
it can publish a notice in the Federal Register and petition OMB for a short-term
125
approval for up to 90 days. Given the length of this process, the Obama administration’s OMB issued guidance to promote the use of “general clearances,” which
provide agencies with a means of obtaining quick approval for certain types of in126
formation collection. Fast-track requests generally apply to the collection of customer feedback, such as visitor or website surveys and require an OMB response
127
within five business days.

B. Effectiveness of the Paperwork Reduction Act
Has the PRA been successful at reducing the federal paperwork burden on the
128
public? Generally speaking, no. While reasons for the ever-increasing paperwork
burden are multi-faceted, the fact remains that the total paperwork burden driven
by the federal government has increased from 6.97 billion to 9.78 billion hours
129
since 1997. That isn’t to say that the PRA is completely ineffective at reducing
burden. The PRA has almost certainly dissuaded agencies from pursuing some in130
formation collections. The high cost of pursuing public information collection
necessarily means that some will be forgone, and one can assume that at least a
portion of these forgone surveys would not have been cost-beneficial. Presumably,
the renewal process encourages some agencies to streamline their information collections or adopt electronic means of collection. Admittedly, it is impossible to
judge the role the PRA process plays in this sort of modernization. However as
Professor Funk noted in 1987, the benefit from identifying duplicative information
collections is not likely to result in savings that drastically reduce the cost of pa-

124.
See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 13-14; Memorandum from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Executive Office of the President, White House Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Guidance on Agency
Survey and Statistical Information Collections, 69 (Jan. 20, 2006), https://www.cio.noaa.gov/
itmanagement/pdfs/OMBSurveyGuidance_0106.pdf.
125.

5 C.F.R. § 1320.13(a), (d), (f).

126.
Memorandum from Howard Shelanski, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Reg. Affairs, White
House Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Flexibilities under the Paperwork Reduction Act for
Compliance with Information Collection Requirements, 1 (July 22, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/pra_flexibilities_memo_7_22_16_finalI.pdf.
127.

See id.

128.
Stuart Shapiro, The Paperwork Reduction Act: Benefits, Costs and Directions for Reform, 30
GOV’T INFO. Q. 204, 206 (2013).
129.

Id.; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 2.

130.

See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 27.
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perwork for the public.131 Simply put, there isn’t enough duplicative data collection
between federal agencies for this streamline to result in massive new burden savings. Certainly by 2018, one imagines that most of these easy savings have been
identified.
Perhaps the PRA is effective in improving the quality of information collection. The PRA provides the public with the opportunity to comment on proposed
132
information collection activities, with some exceptions. Public participation, or
at least the knowledge of its requirement, could improve information collection.
But while one study found that in a two month period, sixty-three percent of regu133
lations put forward for notice and comment received public comments, a 2005
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report estimated that only around sev134
en percent of information collection activities receive public comments. Comments tend to be concentrated around a few requests that are high-cost or connect135
ed to contentious rulemakings. This could be the fault of ineffectual outreach by
136
agencies or OMB; the GAO report recommended that more be done. In the case
of notice-and-comment rulemaking, studies have found that with few exceptions,
comments are dominated by regulated industry, reflecting the public choice theory
137
maxim that the costs of rulemaking are concentrated and the benefits diffuse.
This is, if anything, more likely to be the case for many information collections. As
it stands, the limited public participation that does occur could improve those collections, but it is unclear whether this benefit is worth the delay.
OMB (and CIO) scrutiny and involvement might also improve information
collection. OIRA corrects simple mistakes made by agencies and can encourage a
138
set of government-wide best practices. Not all agencies have expertise in statisti139
cal or survey methods, and encouraging review might improve quality control.

131.

See Funk, supra note 13, at 111.

132.

44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2) (2017).

133.
Stuart Shapiro, Presidents and Process: A Comparison of the Regulatory Process Under the Clinton
and Bush (43) Administrations, 23 J. OF L. & POL’Y 393, 404 (2007).
134.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-424, PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT:
REDUCING BURDEN MAY REQUIRE A NEW APPROACH 24 (2005), https://www.gao.gov/assets/
250/246399.pdf.
135.

SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 15.

136.

See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-424, supra note 134, at 5-6 (2005).

137.
See Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical
Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 105-08 (2011). In a recent example
of this phenomenon, the Securities and Exchange Commission chairman announced a new rule and
cited letters from ‘Main Street investors’—letters that were in fact written as part of a public relations
campaign from industry. Zachary Midler & Ben Elgin, SEC Chairman Cites Fishy Letters in Support of
Policy Change, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-19/secchairman-cites-fishy-letters-in-support-of-policy-change.
138.

See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 13.

139.

Shapiro, supra note 128, at 207.
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However, many agencies do have scientists trained in these fields.140 At agencies
with regular experience running statistical surveys, their scientists and practitioners
might have a better understanding of the constraints and techniques that make
sense in their area than OMB desk officers. One study that interviewed federal experts on PRA effectiveness found that agencies with statistical expertise chafed at
141
what they felt to be outdated statistical standards used by OIRA. Delay caused
by justification and quibbling with OMB will be pure social cost in some contexts.
Finally, the PRA requires calculation of public burden. These data force agencies to consider the costs of information collection and can guide information management policies at agencies to manage their resources at a more socially optimal
level. Agencies must design their survey instruments with the public burden in
mind. On occasion, an agency might forgo a collection when confronted by the
public burden it would generate in comparison to its usefulness to the agency (and
by extension, to the public).
This story would be more compelling were it clearer that the burden estimates
agencies generate for information collections were accurate. Some scholars have
criticized the methodologies used to calculate burden estimates as insufficiently
142
accurate or realistic. The GAO has raised concerns about the rigor and useful143
ness of the estimates generated for OMB review. There is little in the way of
process to test the accuracy of burden estimates if and when an information collection is reviewed.
The failure of the PRA to meaningfully reduce the public burden of information collection certainly is disappointing from the standpoint of reducing paperwork, albeit understandable given the quantity of statutorily-driven paperwork
144
mandates. But the costs generated by the PRA process are also significant.

C. The Burden of the Paperwork Reduction Act on Agencies and the Public
As is clear from the discussion of the operation of the PRA, getting approval
for an information collection is difficult. At best, it takes a great deal of schedule
time. Not merely an administrative burden, there are societal costs associated with
the PRA regime. These come in the form of the literal costs faced by agencies to
comply with the PRA, the delayed benefits from regulations and other agency actions, and the loss of forgone useful information collections.

140.

See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 13-14.

141.

Id.

142.

See, e.g., Samaha, supra note 32; SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 21-22.

143.

See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-424, supra note 134, at 19-21.

144.

See discussion infra Section II.C.
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1. Direct Costs
The direct costs of the PRA are straightforward. Agencies face direct costs
from the labor associated with preparing the paperwork required to receive OMB
approval, and OMB itself bears the cost of evaluating requests from agencies.
These costs should not be minimized. The labor burden associated with this additional administrative work either requires additional staff or simply pulls employees away from their main work. Information collections must be resubmitted every
145
three years and require two public comment periods. A significant amount of
administrative overhead is required to meet and implement these requirements.
This costs taxpayers money and diverts attention from directly delivering the programs and regulations that the agency is substantively intended to provide.

2. Costs from Delay
The indirect costs associated with delay may be even greater than direct costs.
Agencies want to collect information for a reason. As discussed above, these reasons are myriad: support rulemaking, understand the effectiveness of government
146
programs, and improve the delivery of government programs.
Delayed collections mean delayed agency action. At a regulatory agency, this
can mean a delay of a societally beneficial rule and a resulting loss of benefits. An
agency might need the results of a study to justify a proposed rule to OMB or the
courts. Assuming that enacted regulations have survived a cost-benefit analysis, the
147
costs of delay may take the form of injuries, illnesses, or lost lives.
Delayed information collections also affect the government’s ability to deliver
or improve services. Clearly, such delay reduces agency effectiveness, and the public therefore either incurs costs from waste or forgoes benefit from optimized services. Streamlined data collection would better inform a variety of agency decisions, including not only where to develop new regulations, but also what programs
148
or regulations could be cut back. In short, delayed information collection can
blunt agency effectiveness.
Finally, information collections can be beneficial simply through their usefulness to the public. Consider the wide variety of data the federal government makes

145.

See discussion supra Section II.A.2.

146.

See discussion supra Section I.B.

147.
See, e.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 78 Fed. Reg.
70416, 70468 (2013) (providing an analysis of benefits from lives saved from a new airbag rule).
148.
Although there is no doubt that an earnest believer in lean government would appreciate
rigorous procedure for information collections, she should be concerned that such procedure carries
with it the possibility that delayed information collection can allow ineffective or actively costly government programs to run longer than they might otherwise.
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available to the public that comes in via survey or reporting requirements.149 These
surveys can be useful for academic purposes or for the broader public. In some cases, the public availability of data provides a nudge to reporting industry to improve
its behavior, or provides the body politic with the information needed to agitate for
150
necessary lawmaking. If these collections are delayed, so are their benefits.

3. Costs From Forgone Information Collection
Similarly, forgone information collections are costly. Just as with OIRA review of regulations, review of information collections is biased in the negative:
151
OIRA does not review agency inaction. To many, paperwork is a more obvious
152
unmitigated bad than regulation. But to the extent that worthy or cost-beneficial
collections are forgone because of the PRA, the Act imposes costs on the public.
One can assume that information collections rejected by OMB are, indeed,
unworthy. But the costs to an agency in putting forward an information collection,
in terms of schedule delay and pure hassle, cause agencies to forgo information col153
lections that might otherwise provide useful benefits. These collections are not
likely to be the sort of burdensome, mandatory reporting requirements considered
by those who think of government paperwork, but the sort of voluntary surveys
154
that can improve agency decision-making and program offerings. It simply may
not be worth the time for a group of bureaucrats, even those at a research-focused
agency, to spend a year of their time seeking OMB review for a study.
It is also worth considering what replaces formal information collection when
the PRA causes an agency to abandon that approach. After all, the need for data
doesn’t disappear. The definition of information collection encourages agencies to
155
limit their collections to nine or fewer interviews to avoid PRA requirements.

149.
See, e.g., Employment Situation, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (2019), https://www.bls.gov/
news.release/empsit.toc.htm (report released monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which includes
the estimated unemployment rate and is sourced from two surveys of the public).
150.
For an example of data reporting that has affected the supplying industry, see, e.g., The College Scorecard, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).
151.
The review process for information collections is, as with regulatory review, purely a negative check; a review of action only. See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review,
Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L. J. 1337, 1377-79 (2013) (discussing the limited capacity of
OMB review to overcome capture induced agency inaction in rulemaking).
152.
Paperwork is a deadweight loss, while regulation is presumably cost-beneficial. See discussion supra Section II.A. See also Thaler, supra note 22.
153.
See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 27-28 (recounting interviews with federal officials describing
forgone surveys and other research because of PRA delay and burden).
154.
Congressionally mandated information collections will be higher priorities for agencies and
have an easier time meeting OIRA review (as their justification is clear), while agencies are more likely
to decide that the burden of justifying a voluntary survey (and the accompanying schedule delay) is not
worth pursuing.
155.

See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 27-28.
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Such anecdotal data collection undoubtedly has the effect of limiting the usefulness
156
and the accuracy of such studies. Agencies might also find themselves having to
turn to regulated industry for data and information, the sort of behavior that raises
157
popular concerns of agency capture.
Forgoing collection itself can make rulemaking challenging. Rulemaking requires data to fine-tune requirements and to support required cost-benefit analyses. In particular, the benefits of regulations can be particularly difficult to val158
ue. Hard-look review demands robust data to support rulemaking; and in an era
of rigorous cost-benefit analysis, good data is needed to get rules approved within
159
the Executive Branch as well. Forgoing data collection has the effect of undermining the functioning of agencies, their programming delivery, and the types of
beneficial regulations they can propose and issue.

4. The PRA as a Political Tool
Finally, although a centralized information collection hub at OMB provides
some benefits, it also comes with costs inherent to OMB’s position within the
White House. Much has been written about the effects of increased White House
160
161
influence on the regulatory process via OMB from both sunny and dim views.
While paperwork is a much less alluring target than regulation, information collection can also be subject to political manipulation.
In 2016, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) initiated
a reporting requirement imposed on employers with more than 100 employees to
submit data regarding gender pay equity—a goal in line with the political priorities
162
of the Obama administration. The collection was approved by OMB in Septem163
ber of 2016. In 2017, the Trump administration’s OIRA Administrator initiated
a review of the data collection and stayed the requirement, effectively excusing tar-

156.
A general principle of survey and qualitative research is that a larger sample reduces the
error associated with sampling. See ROGER SAPSFORD, SURVEY RESEARCH 90-91 (2d ed. 2007).
157.
See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 B ELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3 (1971) (describing the theory of agency capture).
158.
See e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflection on the Relationship Between
the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 352-53 (2014) (speculating
about how the difficulty of conducting cost-benefit analyses on regulations contributes to trouble in
advancing environmental regulations).
159.

See id.

160.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs:
Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013).
161.

See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 158 (responding to Sunstein, supra note 160).

162.
Bernard Bell, “Equal Pay for Equal Work” & Overturning Close to “Midnight” Actions, 36 YALE
J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 10, 2019), http://yalejreg.com/nc/equal-pay-for-equal-workoverturning-close-to-midnight-actions/.
163.

Id.
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geted employers from having to comply with the reporting requirement. 164 A district court later reversed OIRA’s action as a violation of the APA, allowing the re165
porting requirement to go back into effect. OIRA had attempted to justify its
166
review on procedural deficiencies in the EEOC’s information collection request.
It isn’t hard to see this in a political light, however. An administration opposed to
an independent agency’s interpretation of its mission used the tools of the PRA to
stop an information collection to which it was presumably ideologically opposed.
Perhaps such interference is simply the exercise of a President’s prerogative to control the actions of executive agencies. But to the extent that agency action is to be
167
based on reasoned, scientific judgment rather than political caprice, this use of
the PRA is concerning.
For some, reducing agency effectiveness might be a feature, not a bug. For
those ideologically opposed to the administrative state, slowing its operations
168
might itself be a social good. This is not to say that the intent behind the PRA
was to add useless procedure to slow the operations of the administrative state. As
discussed above, the available evidence suggests that the PRA was a well169
intentioned attempt at reducing the paperwork burden the public faces. However, today there is widespread popular hostility to the administrative state that embraces additional and unnecessary proceduralism as a tool to slow what it perceives
170
as harmful government action. For those who do believe that the administrative
state delivers more good than bad, however, the burden the PRA places on agencies appears likely to outweigh its benefits.

164.
Memorandum from Neomi Rao, Admin., Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Victoria
Lipnic, Acting Chair, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (Aug. 29, 2017).
165.

Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr. v. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 358 F. Supp. 3d. 66 (D.D.C. 2019).

166.

Rao, supra note 164.

167.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (opining that agency actions should be informed by reasoned judgment rather than political gain).
168.
There have been, for instance, a number of bills introduced by Congressional conservatives
seeking to introduce significant procedure to prevent the adoption of significant rules. See, e.g., Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing the reintroduction of formal
rulemaking, which passed the House in the 115th Congress). For further discussion of the Regulatory
Accountability Act, see generally William Funk, Requiring Formal Rulemaking Is a Thinly Veiled Attempt to
Halt Regulation, THE REG. REV., May 18, 2017, https://www.theregreview.org/2017/05/18/funk-formalrulemaking-halt-regulation/; see also Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347377 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.3347377.
169.

See discussion supra Section II.C.

170.
See Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 5-6), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347377 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.3347377.
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III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Two things are true: the PRA has been largely unsuccessful at reducing the
paperwork burden agencies impose on the public, and largely successful at increasing the paperwork burden within agencies. Regardless of which of these one finds a
more pressing concern, some reform is needed.
I propose largely eliminating the PRA. As evidenced, it has succeeded only in
handicapping the effective administration of government with relatively little to
show for it. When considered in light of the current state of administrative law, the
PRA fits into the category of procedure that might appeal on the surface, but
merely inhibits agency action to the ultimate detriment of the public good. This
Part begins with an overview of previous proposals for reform of the PRA, before
expanding on the proposal to largely eliminate the Act.

A. Prior Proposals for Reform
There is relatively little scholarship on reforms to the PRA, but what has been
proposed comes from two camps. First, there are those who believe the PRA is a
toothless piece of legislation that needs more aggressive enforcement, including
171
judicial review, to reduce the burden on the public. Second, there are those who
agree that the PRA interferes unnecessarily with agency functioning and thus
172
needs to be adapted to reduce the burden on agencies. I address these existing
proposals below in turn.

1. Arguments for Modifying the PRA Regime to Add Enforcement
A few academic proposals express concern that the PRA has been largely ineffective at reducing paperwork burden due to poor enforcement. By encouraging
more robust review by OMB and the judiciary, they argue that the ends of the
PRA might be more effectively achieved. There is more than a little truth to the
notion that the PRA lacks teeth. Violations of the PRA have been historically
commonplace, peaking at 800 in 1999 before dropping significantly in the 2000s—
173
rising again to 283 in 2016. Such violations are typically not punished with more
than a stern letter from the OMB director. Interestingly, OMB itself appears out
of compliance with the PRA. As of this writing, the agency has not published its
171.
See, e.g., Andrew L. Levy, Comment, The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980: Unnecessary Burdens and Unrealized Efficiency, 14 J. L. & COM. 99, 120-21 (1994).
172.
173.

See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 8.

OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFFAIRS, FISCAL YEAR 1999
INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, at 269-305,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/icb-fy99.pdf;
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFFAIRS, 2016 INFORMATION
COLLECTION BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 9, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
whitehouse.gov/files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/icb/icb_2016.pdf.
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statutorily mandated Information Collection Budget document since the 2016 fis174
cal year. At a minimum, this delay could reflect the significant workload placed
on OIRA.
175
One proposal is for more robust judicial review of the PRA. One form this
can take, as exemplified in the EEOC pay equity collection discussed earlier, is
176
through increased use of the APA to review OIRA action. APA review of ac177
tions taken under the PRA rarely occurs today. Other means include more robust enforcement of the public protection clause discussed earlier, which exempts
178
the public from penalties associated with noncompliant information collections.
One proposal is an exclusionary rule of sorts for the protection clause, where any
information collected through noncompliant collections would be suppressed for
179
use in enforcement proceedings. Although this might have the effect of incentivizing agencies in narrow circumstances to better comply with the strictures of the
PRA, courts have rejected such a theory because the clause is intended to protect
180
the public, not disincentivize agency action.
Another proposal, put forward by Professor Sunstein, would have Congress
amend the PRA to allow legal challenges to “arbitrary or capricious” approvals by
181
OIRA. This would allow individuals to use the APA to challenge actions by gov182
ernment officials that are arbitrary or capricious in federal court. Professor Sunstein envisions judicial review as a vehicle for ensuring that agencies act in compliance with the law and with the PRA, which he characterizes as creating
183
“burden . . . that has not been minimized and has little practical utility.”
In other contexts, this judicial review has provided an important vehicle for
regulated parties to ensure that executive actions are in line with their enabling
statutes. But robust, “hard-look” judicial review has also led to concerns of agency
ossification, where agencies are overly cautious because of the near-guaranteed legal challenges to rules that are not supported by the communities they seek to reg-

174.
Author’s review of the Office of Management and Budget website. Despite data calls for the
Fiscal Year 2017 and 2018 Information Collection Budgets, FY2016 is the most recent report available,
perhaps reflecting the limited staff resources of OIRA for reviewing information collection requests.
175.

See Levy, supra note 171, at 118-19 (1994).

176.

See id.

177.
See Bell, supra note 162, at n.14 (“In the D.C. Circuit, there appear to be only three cases
since 1995 that challenge OMB’s actions or inaction under the Paperwork Reduction Act” (1) United to
Protect Democracy v. Presidential Advisory Comm. on Election Integrity, 288 F. Supp. 3d 99 (D.D.C.
2017); (2) Tozzi v. EPA, 148 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2001); (3) Public Citizen v. Lew, 127 F. Supp.2d
1 (D.D.C. 2000)”).
178.

44 U.S.C. § 3512 (2012). See discussion supra Section II.A.

179.

See Levy, supra note 171, at 116.

180.

United States v. Takeo Matsumoto, 756 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (D. Haw. 1991).

181.

Cass R. Sunstein, Sludge and Ordeals, 68 DUKE L. J. 1843, 1879 (2019).

182.

5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(b) (2017).

183.

Sunstein, supra note 181, at 1878.
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ulate.184 One can imagine that agencies and an OIRA facing the prospect of such
particularized judicial review would be significantly more cautious in approving
new surveys or information collection efforts, particularly where an information
collection would affect a well-heeled regulated industry. For statutorily mandated
collections, especially those that generate significant burdens like the FAFSA or
tax returns, such review might generate worthy benefits, as Professor Sunstein en185
visions. But these proposals would almost certainly increase the costs from delay
and forgone actions associated with the PRA, not to mention the significant litiga186
tion costs and burdens this would generate.
Professor Sunstein recommends additional amendments to the PRA that
187
would change the extent of OIRA review. Among others, Professor Sunstein
proposes requiring that the benefits of paperwork justify its costs, and that agencies
be explicitly required to choose the most cost-effective means of achieving their
188
information collection needs.
Such changes are, on their face, sensible. Agencies should design their information collections with a healthy sense of economy and seek to continually improve them to reduce the costs and burdens they place on the public. But in the
case of information collection, a strict cost-benefit review does not make sense. It
is difficult enough to monetize the intangible benefits of some environmental regu189
lations; the benefits of information collections are likely to be much more difficult to quantify. Professor Sunstein, recognizing this, characterizes such an examination as one of balancing the purposes of information collection and the costs
190
imposed on the public. But even with that abstraction, the increased burden of
justifying each proposed information collection would certainly lead to forgone

184.
See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on ‘Deossifying’ the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L. J.
1385, 1391 (1992). For general discussion on the extent and causes of agency ossification, see JERRY L.
MASHAW ET. AL., ADMIN. L., 783-96 (7th ed. 2014).
185.

See Sunstein, supra note 181, at 1878.

186.
This impact could have a particular valence. Suppose an agency seeks to survey an industry
to glean information that could be used at a later date to support rulemaking that the industry opposes.
That regulated industry would have essentially two opportunities to challenge that action legally. The
prospect of such challenge might very well further the extent of ossification, where agencies daunted by
the effort required to sustain their actions in the court forgo not only the regulation but also their research and data gathering functions. See McGarity, supra note 184, at 1391; Mashaw et. al., supra at 78396.
187.

See Sunstein, supra note 181, at 1879-81.

188.

Id. at 1879-80.

189.

See discussion supra accompanying note 158.

190.
See Sunstein, supra note 181, at 1881. One of the faults of cost-benefit analysis is the challenge associated with properly estimating benefits that are difficult to quantify. Without further research (sometimes the sort that requires OIRA clearance under OIRA) to provide mechanisms to measure benefits, the cost-benefit analysis can disincentivize the pursuit of actions that have less measurable
benefits. One could easily imagine this encompassing information collection.
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surveys and generalized delays in new collections, increasing the paperwork burden
internally and disincentivizing government action.
Professor Sunstein’s proposals fall into the trap of “proceduralism” described
191
by Professor Nicholas Bagley. Professor Sunstein argues for these improvements
as a way to increase the effectiveness of government programs by decreasing the
192
administrative hurdles to participation. His means at achieving these worthy
goals, however, involve massively increasing the procedural burden agencies face
when they try to act. This fits Professor Bagley’s description of “proceduralism” on
the political left: those supportive of government action broadly, who agree with
increasing administrative procedure as a means of protecting against abuses of
193
power by Executive Branch bureaucrats.
Professor Bagley argues that those on the left who are supportive of such increased procedure both underestimate the costs associated with that procedure and
the extent to which procedure is used by the right as an explicit tool of limiting the
194
administrative state. First, conservatives who oppose the functioning of the administrative state have proposed legislation that would provide drastically increased procedural hurdles for agencies with the explicit goal of making it harder
195
for agencies to enact their statutory missions. But even procedure that lacks such
an explicit ideological valence (such as the PRA) has that very effect, making it
harder for the administrative state to enact rules and take action to protect the
196
public’s safety and wellbeing. Although well-meaning, requiring strict judicial
review and enhanced cost-benefit analysis would serve to drastically increase the
procedure required for information collection in ways that would be detrimental to
the functioning of government and to the public good.

2. Arguments for Modifying the PRA Regime to
Reduce the Burden on Agency Functioning
The most comprehensive recent examinations of the Paperwork Reduction
Act are a series of papers by Professor Stuart Shapiro. Professor Shapiro was hired
by the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) to understand the
197
effect of the PRA. His report was released in two stages: a first draft that in-

191.

See generally Bagley, supra note 170, at 3.

192.
See Sunstein, supra note 181, at 1850-51. His example of voter registration is one of wholly
unnecessary administrative burden placed on the public, albeit one largely outside the control of the
federal government (and by extension, the PRA).
193.

See Bagley, supra note 170, at 4-5.

194.

See generally id.

195.

See discussion supra at note 168.

196.

See discussion supra at Section II.C.

197.

SHAPIRO, supra note 8.
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cluded proposals for Congressional change, 198 and a final report focusing on admin199
istrative changes. The second report led to a set of proposed administrative recommendations directed at OIRA to improve the speed and effectiveness with
200
which it can process information collection requests. This includes: the increased
use of expedited clearance procedures, such as the use of generic clearances and fast
track procedures adopted by the Obama administration OIRA; improved training
and distribution of information from OIRA to agencies on how to submit information requests; refining the required supporting statement agencies must submit
with a proposed information collection; and improving the computer system used
201
to submit and track information collection requests. All are worthwhile suggestions that could reduce the costs associated with delay and forgone information requests. However, in large part because these proposals operate within the structure
of the current statute, they are in total, small improvements that would have only a
minor impact on the identified costs of the PRA.
Professor Shapiro’s original suggestions for statutory change would provide
greater benefit by reducing bureaucracy. He advocated for amending the PRA to
202
increase the time between renewals from three to five years. This would significantly decrease the annual load for both agencies and OIRA and would do so for a
category of approvals that, in his view, sees little improvement from the PRA pro203
204
cess. His second proposal, echoing a prior GAO recommendation, was to
eliminate the initial sixty-day comment period before an agency submits an infor205
mation collection request to OMB. He argues that the later thirty-day comment
period serves the same purpose, and that significant delay and little benefit occurs
206
from a second bite at the apple for commenters. Finally, he proposes altering the
statutory requirements for the Information Collection Budget report to Congress,
specifically eliminating the annual request for information from agencies them207
selves. He notes that this information is generally available on OIRA’s webpage
on information requests (reginfo.gov), that the report as published is not useful to

198.

Id.

199.

STUART SHAPIRO, PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT EFFICIENCIES, ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (May 14, 2018), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/paperwork-reduction-act-efficiencies-final-report.pdf.
200.
ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT EFFICIENCIES
PROPOSED RECOMMENDATION (June 14, 2018), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
paperwork-reduction-act-efficiencies-recommendation-for-plenary.pdf.
201.

Id.

202.

SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 39.

203.
Id. at 38-39 (Professor Shapiro assumes that most benefits of OIRA review come from new,
rather than renewed, information collection requests.).
204.

Id. at 42.

205.

Id. at 40-41.

206.

Id.

207.

Id. at 42-44.
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the general public or OMB, and that it serves as unnecessary paperwork for agen208
cies and OIRA alike. These proposals are, as with the administrative changes, all
worthy. All would serve to reduce some of the burden and public cost generated by
the PRA. Yet all generated controversy at the related ACUS committee meeting
209
such that they were not formally adopted. But even these proposals are all marginal changes that would still result in forgone information collection and significant delay.

B. Eliminating the Paperwork Reduction Act
As outlined, the PRA generates relatively few benefits. To be fair, it offers the
potential for improvement in the rigor of new and existing information collections,
encourages the collection of data on paperwork burdens, and forces agencies to forgo some information collections that are undoubtedly not cost beneficial. But the
net benefit of these attributes is minimal, and it has not succeeded in a meaningful
way at its namesake goal—reducing paperwork. At the same time, it generates a
significant amount of paperwork for agencies. Agencies face processing times ranging from six months to a year for developing information collection requests from
duplicative and underutilized commenting processes and a severely understaffed
210
OIRA. Despite the PRA’s intent to eliminate and streamline mandatory reporting, such collections include voluntary surveys and other data collections that are
211
unlikely to impose a significant burden on industry or the public.
I propose eliminating the bulk of the PRA. Specifically, information collection
212
requests should no longer need to be submitted to OIRA for review. Agencies
should still retain internal functions to oversee paperwork burdens, but the OIRA
approval processes and notice-and-comment procedures would be eliminated.
This repeal would have a number of benefits. First and most obviously, agencies would more easily be able to collect data. This would be particularly beneficial
for voluntary collections. Agencies would be able to pursue statistical surveys and
other forms of research to support rulemaking and program evaluation simply and
easily. They would be able to respond to changing conditions or emergencies more
simply. This would lead to more accurate and well-supported rulemaking and
would streamline program delivery and efficiency.

208.

Id.

209.
Shapiro, supra note 199, at 30. Professor Shapiro is not explicit about what the controversy
was regarding. One could imagine a) disagreement at what appropriate statutory revisions should be, b)
disagreement regarding the propriety of offering statutory recommendations, or c) a reluctance to offer
suggestions that might “weaken” the PRA.
210.

See discussion supra at notes 8-10.

211.

See discussion supra at Section II.A.1.

212.
Of course, the PRA created OIRA, and so OIRA’s statutory mandate would need to be preserved to include its primary modern and largely non-statutory function: the review of agency action
under Exec. Order 12866.
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Such a change would also free up resources. OIRA would be able to prioritize
rulemaking review, speeding the process of promulgating societally beneficial rules
(and removing rules that are no longer cost-beneficial). Agencies would be able to
move resources currently devoted to the administrative burden of PRA review to
other types of knowledge management functions and work directly related to their
mandates. Eliminating these direct costs would have significant benefit across the
federal government.
To be sure, some of the benefits of the PRA would be lost. Mandatory reporting requirements would be easier to implement, which would come at a cost to
regulated entities. However, such requirements are often subject to a form of
213
OIRA review as rulemakings already, minimizing the change. Further, such a
change would recognize the fact that most mandatory reporting requirements are
driven by statute and Congressional interest. Take the example of industry lobby214
ing around tax returns. Ultimately, many of the drivers of paperwork burden are
out of the hands of agencies; eliminating the burden of PRA requirements would
acknowledge this.
Some of the initial benefits of the PRA, such as the elimination of duplicative
collections, may be lost. This could be mitigated by encouraging agencies to maintain an internal review of mandatory paperwork burdens and periodically conduct
reviews of burden. But even without this, eliminating the PRA would not change
the political unpopularity of mandatory information collection. Administrations
215
have long decried paperwork associated with the administrative state; agencies
would still have to contend with substantial political pressure to reduce the burden
associated with information collection even without a PRA review process.
The public would lose its constructive ability to comment on proposed information collections. But as discussed above, such commenting is rarely utilized.
Like agency notice-and-comment, it is not unreasonable to assume that the majori216
ty of commenting parties are regulated entities. Such organizations cannot be
said to lack the sort of political influence to seek statutory changes on the mandates
that generate reporting requirements in the first place, or pressure administrations
to reduce burdens they dislike.
Finally, without OMB review, the rigor of information collection may suffer
slightly. The extent to which OMB review improves the quality of information
217
collections is contested. But certainly, in marginal cases, there may be a decline
in quality. However, agencies collect information for a reason. They have intrinsic
incentives to make sure such collection is accurate and well-supported, and many
surveys are put forward by trained statisticians and other professionals across the

213.

See discussion supra at Section II.A.1.

214.

See discussion supra at Section I.A.

215.

See discussion supra at Section I.C.

216.

See supra note 134.

217.

See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 31.
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federal government. Eliminating the current overlay of OMB review is unlikely to
substantially affect the quality of government statistical research.

•••••
Eliminating the PRA would broadly increase the efficiency of the federal government. It would enable agencies to collect the information they need to properly
fulfill their statutory mandates. On its face, the PRA might appear to be the sort of
sensible procedure that protects the public from inept government requirements
that would otherwise burden the public. In fact, it does little but hobble the functioning of agencies pursuing worthy goals. The current regime of ineffectively regulating paperwork with ever more paperwork should end.

